INTRODUCTION
There is a perception that Uganda, like several African nations held to be beacons of hope in the late 1980s and 1990s, had made a break from bad governance and was headed toward democratization; however rule by men (i.e., the military) rather than by law persists. Yet the rule of law is critical to sustained political and economic development. The lack of respect for the rule of law has adversely affected the emergence of democracy in Uganda. The need for strong, principled, and concerted political leverage by international actors is clear. International insistence on constitutionalism and the rule of law are the keys to Uganda's democratic transformation.
In an increasingly integrated world, characterized by notions of limited sovereignty, 1 development assistance is linked to good governance and rule of law. Unfortunately, there are simply too many stakes in global politics, some of them undergirded by self-interest,2 �hat make this process painfully slow. Nevertheless, it would still be in the interest of international actors to exercise political leverage, which seems to be the only effective antidote to intractable violent conflicts in many African states, including Uganda, whose governments have promulgated progressive constitutions, but have ignored their provisions.
3 The slogan is "Trust the bullet, but despise the ballot." In particular, the Museveni administration in Uganda has encouraged judicial review, but only as a fa c;:a de to placate the international community. Such international action, however, would present an alternative that might forestall insurrection and military confl ict. Conflict prevention ultimately costs less than international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and other forms of intervention in the interest of international peace and security, not to men tion the high costs of human suffering. country weathered one of the greatest threats to humanity with one of the most effective national responses to HIV/ AIDS in Africa.
Occurring equally fast was a radical reversal-as opposed to mere setbacks-and the "new breed" idea is now discredited and all but dead. Increasingly, the Museveni administration became synonymous with personal rule. Yet this did not deter international actors from placating Museveni's administration. For instance, President George W Bush visited Uganda in 2003, two years after the highly disputed elections that provided a critical test for the rule of law under the new Constitution.
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International actors could have used their leverage to require adherence to good governance and the rule of law. Instead, that option was pursued inconsistently and never forcefully enough. A group of international donors meets regularly with the Ugandan government and negotiates budget items, including defense spending. The economic contribution of international actors in this respect is signifi cant and, at least in the long term, almost indispensable. Human Rights Watch reported that these donors provide half of the budget of the Ugandan government, their funds going directly to the treasury after the budget has been agreed on. Although the U.S. government is not part of this donor group, it has provided military assistance and training to Uganda's military, but with no special human rights or good-governance conditions attached.
10 Human Rights Watch further observed that in January 2006, the U.K. government's development ministry announced the withdrawal of US$26 million of direct funding to the government d1 ,1e to concerns about a lack of democratic and economic reform. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Ireland also had reduced aid in 2005. According to the EU Election Observation Mission to Uganda, the February 2006 elections fell short of full compliance with international principles for genuine democratic elections, in particular because a level playing field was not in place.
11
These developments in Uganda are not mere setbacks or hitches in an inevitably imperfect process. There is a determined reliance on the military rather than on normal democratic processes for retention of political power. The military extends presidential term limits and does not worry about hold ing elections because it knows the outcome beforehand. Confi dent in its firm control of electoral commissions, the military intimidates both the electorate and the judici ary if election results are challenged. The consequences are inevitable: cronyism, corruption, decadence, repression of dissent and other freedoms, and economic stagnation or recession. These are the hallmarks of personal rule-the very antithesis of constitutionalism and the rule of law. The regime respects the rule of law only as long as its hold on power is not threatened.
In an increasingly globalized world, the possibility of prosecution of ex presidents under international and transnational law only serves to compound the difficulties of political evolution in emerging nations such as Uganda.12 Nevertheless, with concerted and consistent political leverage by international actors, the momentum of democratic evolution could be sustained. In recent years, international actors have expressed the desire to tie their development assistance and partnership only with countries in the African region character ized by good governance, rule of law, and democracy.13 Despite their estimable intentions, they have not acted consistently or fi rmly enough.As a result,African leaders have been able to "have their cake and eat it." They have been able to get away with their actions under misplaced claims to soverei gn ty.
Good governance includes the rule of law, respect for human rights, free and fair elections, open political processes, and decision making that is transpar ent and accountable. In the sections that follow, two key and strategic areas of globalizing justice--constitutionalism and the independence of the judiciary-are examined. In emerging nations such as Uganda, these two areas constitute indispensable elements of democratic transition on which international actors should focus to establish the rule of law and firm foundations for development and thus avoid a return to a chaotic past. The international community cannot continue to placate African leaders who may at fi rst wear democratic clothing but whose true dictatorial characteristics emerge a few years later.
In 2005, just ten years after the promulgation of the seemingly pro gressive Constitution, the current Uganda administration removed limits on presidential terms, in effect providing the necessary conditions for life presi dencies, by bribing and intimidating members of Parliament. In the 2001 Uganda presidential elections, won by the incumbent (President Museveni), the military intimidated the electorate. Just before the 20Q6 presidential elec tions, the government pressed what were condemned as trumped-up charges of treason and rape against Dr. Kizza Besi gy e, the strongest political opponent to Museveni.
14 When the court granted bail to Dr. Besi gy e, the government sent members of a militia to besiege the High Court in an effort to prevent the bail from taking effect.
15 The Uganda Constitutional Court condemned this attack in The Uganda Law Society v. The Attorney General (2006) 16 as hav ing "violated the Judiciary's independence in Articles 128 (1), (2), and (3) of the Constitution."
17 This was not the first time Ugandans saw the judiciary silenced by the government. In 1971, during the dictatorship of Amin, 18 the military captured and killed the chief justice of Uganda.
19 Besi gy e simulta neously had to answer charges of terrorism before the General Court Mar tial-the military tribunal. Yet even these high-handed tactics of the Museveni administration did not appear to be consequential enough to get the atten tion of international actors.
20 There is a troubling perception that developing countries should not be pressed to adhere to the same standards as obtained elsewhere simply because they are developing countries. Yet forei gn assistance to these countries is of no use unless the donors insist on the development of democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law. Constitutionalism, understood here as the maintenance of constitutional supremacy, requires judicial review of the constitutionality of laws enacted by Parliament and the acts of governments. Judicial review is crucial to the maintenance of a democratic dispensation based on the notions of checks and balances of the central powers, the rule of law, and individual rights. The framers of the Constitution appreciated these notions. 21 Judicial review became the power of the judiciary to bring state organs under the superior rule of law 22 and thus control the excesses of government that are often used to subvert democracy.
The supremacy of constitutional rules is genuine only if it is guaranteed by an institution that is independent of the political authorities whose acts are being reviewed.
23 This is perhaps the best rationale for judicial review. In an autocracy, in which judicial independence is nonexistent and judicial review is not exercised, constitutional supremacy is a myth. The Constitution provides for judicial review, under which governmental acts and laws can be chal lenged before the Constitutional Court and, on appeal, the Supreme Court.
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Judicial review is entrenched in the Constitution, because it provides that the people of Uganda are soverei gn and that the constitution is supreme.
25 In
26 the Uganda Supreme Court invoked that provision while observing that Parliament cannot clothe itself with "[s]upremacy which in Uganda lies in the majesty and sanctity of the Constitution," and that " [I] n Uganda, it is in the people and the Con stitution that soverei gn ty resides." Ugandan courts handed down numerous decisions that evidenced this progressive understanding of the source of the Constitution's legitimacy and authority. In just ten years from the time the Constitution went into effect, there have been close to forty constitutional cases.
27 Although some applied cross-border legal norms on the supremacy of constitutions in constitutional democracies, most relied on the views and the intentions of the framers of the Constitution.
28 However, after twenty years in power, the increasingly personal rule , of Museveni has begun to adversely affect the progress made earlier in establishing the rule of law through judicial review. In fact, there have been instances in which judicial review was used to advance a contrary purpose-the legitimization of personal rule.
In a series of cases brought by the political opposition, the government endured stinging losses in the Constitutional Court. To that extent, it seemed like there was an increasing respect for the rule of law. Yet later decisions that involved challenges to the political establishment faced hostile reac tions from Parliament and the executive. In Major General David Tinyefuza v. Attorney General (1996) , the Constitutional Court delivered its fi rst landmark decision under the Constitution, setting a progressive trend. 29 In Dr. Paul K.
Ssemogerere et al. vs. Attorney General of Uganda (2002),
30 the Constitutional Court seemed to advance the rule of law when it struck down certain pro visions of the Political Parties and Organisations Act and declared that the ruling "Movement" 3 1 amounted to a one-party system. The court reasoned that " [P] luralism is a core concept in democracy and that political parties are not always negative and can offer constructive criticism to the government." The court held that the restrictions in the impugned statute were unjustifi able in a free and democratic society.
In Paul K. Ssemogerere and Zachary Olum v. Attorney General (1999), 32 the Constitutional Court struck down another Act of Parliament-the Referendum and Other Provisions Act (1999)-on the ground that it was passed without the requisite quorum. The government respected the decision and sought to enact a new referendum law consistent with parliamentary procedure. The new law, debated for only two hours, was in form and substance a replica of the old one. Two petitions swiftly challenged the new referendum law on grounds of retrospectivity and contravention of parliamentary procedures. In the mean time, the national referendum was held and, if the results are to be believed, the people of Uganda favored Museveni's preferred "Movement" 33 system to a multiparty system. Thereafter presidential elections were held under that "Move ment" system, and Museveni was said to have won the elections. When this new referendum law came before the Constitutional Court;-the outcome was the same as in Paul K. Ssemogerere & Anor. v. Attorney General (1999).
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When Justice Tw inomujuni held that "no political system was ever put in place," the constitutionality of Museveni's election was placed under question. An enraged Museveni promptly and publicly condemned what he called the court's usurpation of people's power, which he called "totally unac ceptable." He maintained:
[I]f the people do not have the power, then who are the judges? You're even less qualifi ed .... It is clear, legislative power belongs to Parliament, executive power belongs to the President, and judicial power belongs to the courts. But when you get a court trying to legislate-now trying to make law or to write a constitution-then if you don't correct that you get into problems. 36 In the latter case, the Uganda Supreme Court held that "meaningful participation of the governed in their governance, which is the hallmark of democracy, is only assured through optimal exercise of the THE ROLE OF INTERNATI ONAL ACTORS 185 freedom of expression. This is as true in the new democracies as it is in the old ones. " Yet the government's reaction made it clear that it would toler ate judicial oversight and the rule of law only to the extent that it did not jeopardize its overall objective of retaining political power. The government warned that if the judiciary ignored that critical. interest it would resort to military power-the very antithesis of democracy and the rule of law. While stating that he could i gn ore the striking down of the "false news" provisions in the Onyango case-which in his view amounted to the court sanctioning "telling lies" 37 -Museveni warned that the government and its military would not tolerate court rulings that represented potential threats to the current political establishment. In a statement that would have a chilling effect on the capacity of courts to uphold the rule of law and democracy, Museveni warned:
[T]he ones who are playing these games, should play them in other areas like they normally do and we ignore. Like for instance a judge who declared recently that telling lies is legal ... . We fought Korry, defeated him, we fought these other groups ADF [Allied Democratic Forces], FOBA [Force Obote Back Again] to defend the NRM [National Resistance Movement] system, to defend Uganda and to def end the soverei gn ty of the people. That soverei gn ty can't be taken away by court maneuvers by Ssemogerere and his group. It will not happen .... I am repeating that the government, including the national executive will not allow any institution including the court to usurp the power of the constitution in any way:
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Such statements fundamentally undercut the rule of law and indepen dence of the judiciary. The current chief justice of Uganda, Benjamin Odoki, responded to these threats:
[A]s regards the Judiciary, its independence means that it is not in a position to consult or c?mpromise with any of the other two organs of the State in making judicial dec. isions. The Judiciary has taken this constitutional role seriously in adjudicating constitutional and other issues. This has sometimes provoked undue and harsh responses from the executive. For as long as the Judiciary is alive to its institutional role, constitutional mandate and jurisdictional limitations, it should be left free to administer justice impartially and equally between citizens and the government .... The three organs of the State must learn to respect the functions and powers of each other. ... Each organ must avoid intimidation .. .. Unless such tendency is avoided, it may create a dictatorship of one organ against the rest, and the entire country.
The bases for personal rule in Uganda are the use of the military in politics and the relegation of law to a secondary place in the resolution of political difference. 40 The military is loyal to a single person-its founder-and is not sufficiently institutionalized and professionalized. The provisions of the Constitution alone cannot stop the use of the military in domestic politics. The courts' impotence in the face of the executive's reliance on the military or intimidation to protect the political establishment is best illustrated in three recent instances. In the first, the courts have been powerless in politi cal cases that challenged the conduct of presidential elections. In 2001, when Museveni faced the stiffest challenge to his grip on power, he quickly deployed the military to intimidate the electorate. In a split three-to-two decision, the Supreme Court largely accepted the evidence in Kizza Besigye v. YK. Musev eni and the Electoral Commission (2001) 41 but ambi gu ously ruled in the favor of Museveni, stating, "The fact that these malpractices were proved to have occurred is not enough ... the petitioner had to go further and prove their extent, degree, and the substantial effect they had on the election."
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In the second instance, as if the repressive conduct of elections was not enough to undermine the democratic process, the Museveni administration amended the Constitution to provide for what effectively amounts to "life presidency"
43 and a significantly diminished competence of judicial review of executive and legislative action. The Constitution originally provided for only two presidential terms, but as a result of the amendment, Musev eni-who came to power in 1986 through a protracted military struggle and has remained in power without any interruptions-became eligible for reelection in 2006 and for infinite times thereafter. In addition, Museveni's government amended the Constitution to limit the extent to which courts would be able to review the constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament. In essence, the amendments excluded the jurisdiction of judicial review if a law was "repealed," "spent," "expired," or "had its full effect at the date of delivery of judgment."
44 Moreover, even if the state did not repeal a particular piece of legislation before the court delivered its review of it, the amendment provided that such judgment would not affect any acts of the state completed under the impugned legislation. This meant that the court would be rendered impotent with regard to the review of laws or acts of government patently enacted or perpetrated in contravention of the Constitution. The fundamental objective was to place the political establishment's actions beyond the reach of law. These developments effectively undermined the constitutional provisions relating to judicial review in Uganda. 45 These developm�nts left a sense of constitutional desperation-the sense that although the Constitution was a largely progressive document in its letter and spirit, in practice it was only a fayade to assuage international criticism and an instrument for the legitimization of the administration's attempt to hold on to power. Yet these developments did not move international actors 47 maintaining that there was no requirement in the law that the presidential candidate must be physically present before he is nominated. These circumstances cast serious doubt on the government's commitment to democracy and the rights to political participation and due process. 48 However, in an act of brute political power, the govern ment deployed the military to besiege the High Court premises and prevented the court order granting bail to Besi gy e from taking effect. The government disregarded the views of Justice James Ogoola, who in granting bail observed that in light of the imminent presidential elections, it was imperative to secure the liberty of the accused until his conviction. 49 Despite the devastating effect of these momentous events on the rule of law and democracy in Uganda, the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the European Union stood idly b y, failing to exert any signifi cant political pressure.
50

ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
The international community could and should have done better in assisting democratization in Uganda. Uganda, like other emerging nations, needs help in its transition toward democracy and the rule of law. More effective political pressure on the Ugandan government and greater insistence on the respect for the rule of law and independence of the judiciary were needed from the international community. there are "many countries in the World to-day with written constitutions but without constitutionalism" and that in "a number of developing countries, constitutions are perceived by those in power, not as protectors of human rights and the liberties of the individual but as instruments for legitimiz ing the exercise of power"). Justice Kanyeihamba then concludes that the "founders and makers of the Uganda 1995 Constitution were determined to avoid the situation described by the learned professor." 4. The United States Agency for International Development makes a similar observation. It states: "U.S. interests in Uganda are twofold. Uganda is a critical player in the region in leading efforts to address regional conflicts peacefully; development and political stability in Uganda is key to East Africa's integration into the global marketplace." USAID, "Democracy and Governance in Uganda," online at http://www. usaid.gov I our_ work/ democracy _and_governance/regions/ afr/uganda.html (visited May 30, 2007).
5. Justice George Kanyeihamba (Uganda Supreme Court) observes that the U ga nda Parliament is "impotent" and "weakened to the extent that whatever the Executive will, it must be done or must occur without resistance from the Parliament." New Vision, online at "Parliament Is Impotent-Judge," http://www. Uganda, respect such international standards. For example, such leverage has been put to good use by the EU, which insists that nations seeking to join the EU respect human rights and the rule of law.
The return to democratic governance and the rule of law in countries like Nigeria 52 and South Africa was due in part to lessons these countries learned from constitutional democracies around the world. It was also due to the role of the international community. The South African case aptly illus trates how effective external pressure by international actors-legitimized by their own traditions of respect for the rule of law-can be in complementing and advancing internal efforts toward greater democracy.
53 After a remarkable transition, South Africa became the exemplar of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law in Africa. Its new Constitutional Court soon established a reputation as being one of the finest in the world.
The Constitutional Court also played a key role in South Africa's move away from its long, dismal, and antidemocratic apartheid past, characterized by repression and states of emergency, to become a multiracial democracy that respects rights, human di gn ity, and the rule of law. In its first politically important and publicly controversial decision, the South African Constitu tional Court struck down the death penalty. 54 The court emphasized that the transitional constitution established a new order in South Africa in which human rights and democracy are entrenched and in which the constitution is supreme. The justices emphasized that the court "must not shrink from its task" of review.
55 Even with the reco gn ition that public opinion seemed to favor the retention of the death penalty, the Constitutional Court answered with the clear statement that it would not "allow itself to be diverted from its duty to act as an independent arbiter of the Constitution;' 56 and that public opinion in itself is "no substitute for the duty vested in the courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or favor:' 57 Justice Arthur Chaskalson reasoned that if public opinion were to be decisive, "there would be no need for constitutional adjudication."
58 This should provide an answer to the populist arguments used in attacking judicial decisions by the Ugandan courts of judicial review.
Another decision by the South African Constitutional Court whose reception in South Africa stands in stark contrast to the Ugandan experience was Executive Council ef the TiVestern Cape Legislature v. President ef the Republic ef South Africa (1995). 59 In this case, the court declared that s.16 (A) of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 (LGTA) amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive. The confl ict erupted when President Nelson Mandela, acting in accordance with amend ing powers granted to the executive in s.16 (A) of the LGTA, took action to counter the attempt by the provincial government in the Western Cape, dominated by the National Party, to demarcate the Cape To wn metropolitan areas, removing all the resource-poor African areas from the wealthy, white-dominated areas. In striking down Mandela's action, the Constitutional Court was hailed by the National Party, opponents of the government, as defenders of the constitution for standing up to the African National Congress (ANC) dominated executive and legislature and for fulfilling the promise of judicial review. In a surprising move, President Mandela praised the court's decision, stating that "this jud gm ent is not the first, nor will it be the last, in which the Constitutional Court assists both the government and society to ensure constitutionality and effective governance." 59 The court had successfully walked the tight line between law and politics, and the government respected its rul ing. This notable case demonstrates how a Constitutional Court can use its power of judicial review, uphold the supremacy of the constitution over the actions of the party in power, and draw acceptance from all parties.
CONCLUSION
Credit must be accorded to Ugandan courts for some courageous decisions they have pronounced amid extremely arduous conditions. Uganda is a fledgling democracy and cannot be expected to instantly achieve standards obtained elsewhere in more developed democracies. However, all emerging nations must strive toward the same democratic ideals in virtue of the universality of human dignity-the grounding principle for human rights. 60 The question is whether or not the state is doing enough given the sociopolitical realities in Uganda. The challenge for Uganda and other emerging democracies consists of demilitarizing its politics, 61 respecting the rule of law, and complying with court orders pursuant to judicial review.
In an increasingly globalized world in which a particular country may not be capable of i gn oring international opinion for a long time, the inter national community should exercise political pressure through the various measures available in an effort to demilitarize political conditions and pro mote respect for the rule of law. Such pressure would be legitimate because Uganda is a signatory to several international legal instruments, particularly with regard to international human rights, and is sensitive to its international image. 62 As part of the effort. to bring political pressure to bear, international actors should be less willing to cooperate with despotic governments. Strict international criteria of political accountability, financial transparency, and development-frie ndly social and economic 'policies should be enforced and used in the evaluation of international relations and the future course such relations should take. ), which provided, inter alia, that information in the custody of Parliament may not be adduced in evidence without its special leave. The Supreme Court held that the procedures for making this law had not been followed and that provisions on the right to a fair hearing had been impliedly amended, as it was not possible to have a fair hearing if access to information necessary for litigation was denied.
36. Uganda Supreme Court, Constitutional Appeal No. 2 of 2002 Gud gm ent of February 11, 2004) (unreported). The decision in which freedom of speech (expres sion) was in issue, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of s.50 of the Uganda Penal Code, which prohibited the publication of "false news." 37. The government tended to respect orders of the court if they concern personal rights as opposed to political rights. 38. New Vision, "Museveni Mad with Judges Over Nullifying 2000 Referen dum Act," online at June 30, 2004, http://www.newvision.co.ug/ (visited January 21, 2005). Whereas Kony, ADF, and FOBA were armed rebel groups that could lawfully and legitimately be confronted by the military, "Ssemogerere" group was a civilian political opposition. Nevertheless, President Museveni si gn aled that the military would be deployed even against the latter group as well if the courts ruled in its favor and critically prejudiced or threatened the establishment's grip on political power. 40. In cases when the government has not used the military, it has employed or acquiesced in activities of paramilitary groups, police and/ or other groups committed to the use of physical force to silence legitimate political opposition and demonstra tions. See, e.g., Patrick Jaramogi, "CMI Boss Praises Kiboko Squad," New Vision, June (November 27, 2005) . The European Union stated only: "The EU views with deep concern the arrest of the FDC leader, Dr. Kizza Besi gy e, and 22 others on charges including treason .... The move to a pluralist democratic system in advance of the next elections in February or March 2006 is seen by the EU as a crucial step in the political development of Uganda."
51. The underlying premise of the reluctance of international actors to exert more effective political pressure is that the developments in Uganda fell within the country' s constitutional framework-an understanding to which the United States makes express reference. However, the concern of international actors should be whether or not an emerging nation has a "constitution without constitutionalism," which encompasses the rule of law and independence of the judiciar y . The irony is that in Africa there is "interest in constitutional reforms 53. It is worth recognizing the efforts of South Africa in the wake of the arrest of the main political opponent to Museveni. South African president Thabo Mbeki promptly paid a visit to Uganda, presumably to exert political pressure on the Museveni admi nistration. The reaction of the media to this visit included a statement to the effect that Mbeki should teach his host how to hand over power peacefully. The reaction of Mbeki was that naturally the two leaders had addressed the matter of the arrest of Dr. Besi gy e.
